

THE «PARADIGM» AS A THEORETICAL CATEGORY IN LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY

Viktoriia Petrushenko¹

¹ Doctor of Science in Medicine, Professor, National Pirogov Memorial Medical University, Vinnytsya (Ukraine)

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9255-403X>

UDC: 159.9:34

АНОТАЦІЯ

Background. The paradigmatic approach to the history of science can be applied in various studies, including those of legal psychology. The use of the term «paradigm» in the study occurs at the intersection of philosophical, epistemological, historical and psychological issues, as well as the issues of the methodology of science and is contextualized in the context of applied law and practical psychology. That's why it creates a need in determining the theoretical foundations of the «paradigm» concept which we would use in a context of legal psychology, but which would include applying the foundations of knowledge from the field of history of science, philosophy of science and philosophy of history.

Objective. To define the theoretical basis of the «paradigm» phenomena in the context of legal psychology, which would include the systematization of the concept's elements into a single epistemological category.

Methods. Structural functionalist method was used while determining the main elements that constitute the term «paradigm», which is best-known by its use in Thomas Saumel Kuhn's theory. Historiosophical, epistemological and gnoseological approaches to understanding the process of paradigmatic development of legal psychology were used to systematize the term «paradigm» into a single category.

Results. The concept of a «paradigm» and/or «paradigmatic approach» are inextricably linked with the development of scientific knowledge and cognition, its socio-psychological and historical conditions, the objective conditions of scientific progress, they constitute the concept of «scientific revolution», which is authored by Thomas Samuel Kuhn as a part of scientific historical discourse. The social element of «paradigm» characterizes the fact that when a the new knowledge must arise it must be axiomatically accepted by the scientific community.

Conclusion. Scientific knowledge, according to Thomas Kuhn, is inherently external in nature, it is influenced from the outside. This constitutes externalism, as one of the directions in the history of science, the representative of which Thomas Kuhn is. The interpretation of specific scientific knowledge, its use, and the very process of formation and functioning of the «paradigms» are influenced by the set of social, political, and cultural attitudes inherent in a particular time. Scientific paradigms arise when there are certain epistemological conditions appear and they create a need to systematize scientific knowledge. At the same time, for epistemological systematization, it is needed to be socially accepted.

Key words: *paradigm, anthropological paradigm, clinical paradigm, legal psychology, paradigm shift, social psychology.*

INTRODUCTION

The legal psychological framework of the term «paradigm» represents a shift that happened during 1950s and 1960s in research practices of human behavioral patterns in legal context (Kankam, 2019: 85-92; Silvia, 2021:1-10). The

term «paradigm» itself and the concept of «scientific revolution» are used in the works of Thomas Samuel Kuhn (Salgar, 2023; Kuhn, 1962), Ferdinand de Saussure, Immanuel Kant, Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as several modern authors and researchers who rely on the classical

Address for correspondence, e-mail: editpsychas@gmail.com
Copyright: © Viktoriia Petrushenko

This is an Open Access journal. This work is licensed under a **Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0)**.
Link: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

works of the above-mentioned authors. The controversy over the definition of criteria for science and methodology is associated, among other things, with the support or criticism of the paradigmatic approach both in modern science and in the field of the philosophy of science. Due to this, the problem of the definition of legal psychology as an independent scientific field arises (Ozerskyi, 2024), which requires additional attention from scientific psychological community (Mendoza, 2023).

One can find the use of the term «paradigm» in the same semantic meaning as the concepts of pattern, scientific tradition, model, regularity, scientific achievement, template, association, image, or even scientific framework, however, given the general nature of this term in scientific discourse (particularly in psychological and philosophical categories of knowledge and perception as epistemology and gnoseology) (Guba E., & Lincoln Y., 1982, 233), it is impossible and incorrect to establish an analogy of the meaning of «scientific paradigm» with only one of the above. The article structures the main elements of the process of scientific development and the components of the concept of «paradigm» in the specified contexts (Ylonen & Aven, 2023; Potili & Zhan, 2023).

Out of contemporary scientific work, over the last 5 years, the issue of paradigm shift in legal psychology and paradigmatic nature of scientific development are represented in various studies (Boechat, 2023; Sternberg, 2023; Neder, 2024; Merlo, 2023; Krauss, 2024; Hilton, et al., 2023; Lehmann-Hasemeyer, 2023; Hauge, 2024).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Methodological approach to the study of

the genesis of any concept, including the paradigm genesis, a historiographical and historiographical approach is necessary. To determine the characteristic features inherent in the paradigmatic approach in science, a method of structural functionalism was used to clarify the essence of the concept of paradigm itself.

Also, the study used epistemological and gnoseological approaches to understanding the process of paradigmatic development of science, paradigm shift and the cycle of scientific revolution (Lehmann-Hasemeyer, 2023; Zagaria, 2024; Sek-Ciudalcampo, & Atencia-Conde-Pumpido, 2024). In particular, the definition of criteria of being scientific (or being a science) (which are also the leitmotif of the paradigmatic approach) is the subject of the epistemological approach, while the structuring of the development of scientific knowledge is the subject of the epistemological approach.

In the context of legal psychological issues (Starynskyi, & Zavalna, 2025: 58-64), and theoretical foundations of this scientific field, study itself addresses the category of «method» as such. Examining the nature of methodological analysis requires defining the methodology of science and its governing principles through synthetic logical operations. Thus, our focus is on human intellectual activity – which is cognitive in essence – as opposed to practical activity in the context of socio-legal relations (including mental ones) (Cominelli, 2025).

RESULTS

A paradigm is a concept which is usually used to characterize a phenomenon that emerges from the synthesis of the study of historical and

scientific processes (Melnyk, 2025b: 300). The concept of the «paradigm» is a key category in the philosophy of history and the philosophy of science; broadly speaking, the term itself is a product of the historiosophy of science.

The word «paradigm» is of a Greek origin (from the word «παράδειγμα») and corresponds to the concept of a «pattern» - denoting a specific recurrence, regularity, or functional model. It dates back to the pre-Christian era, appearing, for instance, in the dialogues of Plato. From the 19th century onwards, the concept came into use in linguistics and semiotics, particularly in the study of established linguistic models within Ancient Greek and Latin (Fernández-Domínguez, J., et al., 2020; Melnyk, 2025a).

The concept of «paradigm» and the term «paradigmatic» are used in the works of the founder of modern linguistics and the most influential representative of structural semiotics – Ferdinand de Saussure, in his work «*Cours de linguistique generale*» (1916), contrasting the paradigmatic relation with the syntagmatic one. The paradigmatic relation is related to the concepts of «association» and «substitution» of morphemes (De Saussure, 1916: 175).

In addition to Ferdinand de Saussure, the concept of «paradigm» in linguistics is often used by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular in his work «Philosophical Experiments» (published after his death in 1953), to denote a similar relationship between linguistic structural elements. In the final indexation in Wittgenstein's work, the word «paradigm» is equated with the concept of «model» (Wittgenstein, 1953). But, the most widely used interpretation of «paradigm» today

was systematized in the 1960s with the participation of representatives of the post-positivist trend in the philosophy of science (Gori, 2024; Bentley, 2024).

As of now, the scientific community has reached a relative consensus regarding who contributed the most to the understanding of the concept of «paradigm». The most influential theorist of the «paradigm» concept is the American historian and philosopher Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922-1996), who formulated the definition of the term as it is understood in the modern history of science (Belgrano, 2021: 1-16).

Categories that are related to the term «paradigm» and similar to the concept of «scientific revolution» are found as early as the late 18th century, among representatives of German classical philosophy, in particular, in Immanuel Kant's philosophical framework as he mentions the so-called «revolution in the way of thinking» (Geier, 2011: 31-32; Vivas-Reyes, 2024).

There are two components that are essential for the formation of a paradigm in a scientific field. Paradigms arise when, on the one hand, there are conditions, and on the other hand, there is a need to systematize scientific knowledge. At the same time, for systematization of knowledge, it must exist and be axiomatically accepted by the scientific community. Thus, we get a full cycle of scientific development, starting from the transition to «normal science» and the emergence of the need to use a paradigm of knowledge, ending with the change of this paradigm to another. This is the process of a scientific revolution, which is cyclical in nature (Schindler, 2024).

Turning to the very structure of the con-

cept of «paradigm», it is worth referring to the work of Thomas Samuel Kuhn «The Structure of Scientific Revolutions» (1962), in which two requirements are put forward for the concept of a scientific paradigm:

1. To become paradigmatic, scientific achievements must be of an unprecedented nature, which determines the formation of a group of followers who refuse to use different scientific approaches.

2. This scientific achievement must have a formulating, first-problem nature, and postulate new scientific problems (Kuhn, 1962: 10).

Thus, a scientific paradigm is a model of scientific knowledge and inquiry, or a scientific tradition. A characteristic feature of a scientific paradigm is its fundamental unity. A scientific paradigm is simultaneously determined by scientists and at the same time a determinant of its emergence.

According to T. S. Kuhn, the crisis of science is a harbinger of further scientific revolution. The crisis of the situation lies in the inability of the previously dominant scientific paradigm to interpret a new form of reality, which naturally produces a conflict between different gaps «accumulation of facts», which seek to turn into new dominant paradigms of science. The theoretical and methodological struggle will be waged until a new dominant paradigm emerges, which will be characterized by a radically different language of science, a conceptual and categorical apparatus unlike previous times, and a different methodology of scientific research. In addition to terminology, there must also be a change in the truth criteria and, in general, the logic of finding the criteria.

One way or another, the scientific revolution leads to the replacement of the previous prevailing paradigm with a new paradigm in science and therefore establishes a new «normal science» (Kuhn, 1962; Hauge, 2024). After all, in a normal scientific study T. S. Kuhn recognizes any scientific work that «refers to one or more scientific achievements» (Kuhn, 1962). At the heart of normal science is once again the need of a scientist to solve «puzzles», which never leads to real discoveries, but allows to produce work that aimed at isolating and collecting conditionally «new» facts (Mayoral, 2023; Walasik, 2024). Of course, this is how anomalies reappear, which will lead to another scientific crisis in the future.

In my opinion, the scientific paradigm in the context of legal and psychological knowledge should be interpreted as follows: the scientific paradigm of legal psychology – is a system of beliefs about the nature of the human psyche in law (Lorenzetti, et al., 2024), consisting of guiding ideas, fundamentally important values and their determined value attitudes, specific methods of assessment by a psychologist of legal norms and the level of legal awareness in society, and is also shared by a wide, methodologically and geographically diverse circle of researchers. Undoubtedly, the most consistent influence of one or another scientific paradigm is left in theoretical works, while psychological and legal empirical explorations and scientific and practical publications more often serve as an applied embodiment of those elements that I propose to consider as constituent parts of the branch definition of a scientific paradigm (Beccera & Cardenas, 2025).

Thomas Kuhn employs the term «normal science» to denote the very process of acquiring

scientific knowledge – that is, scientific research activity itself. The integrity of scientific knowledge in a specific era is opposed to the idea of scientific knowledge and the scientific process as an evolutionary-historical process (Tanghe, 2023). Scientific pluralism, as one of the attributes of the concept of «paradigm», contradicts the desire of positivists to unify the methodology of science using empirical methods to obtain «objective» knowledge (Demidenko, & Bilous, 2023: 317-322). Paradigm is a post-positivist phenomenon, because science itself and the scientific process are changing phenomena (Joshua, 2014).

The very genesis of the term «paradigm» includes the concept of a «scientific school», the main criteria for differentiation of which is the use of the scientific method or the «dictates of scientific observation and method» (Kuhn, 1962). Thus, a scientific direction can be considered scientific, regardless of the method inherent in it, and depending on the existence of a dominant paradigm in it (Kuhn, 1962: 4).

Unwanted facts for the paradigm are called «anomalies». Separately, I note that from the point of view of philosophical hermeneutics, it does not matter to what extent the facts, including «anomalous», correspond to the real surrounding reality. It should be considered a hermeneutic fact that it is narratively acceptable for social reality and receives the greatest socio-cultural dissemination. Therefore, for fact to truly turn into a factual reality, first, public approval is needed, which is achieved by means of agitation, propaganda, and informational positioning. The effectiveness of the implementation that arrives in the new reality campaign is clearly correlated with social fatigue from the dominance of tradi-

tional ideas about the actual manifestations of socio-cultural values. The psychological structure of any society, as well as the mental attitudes of a specific individual, are always built upon unstoppable and tireless searches for something new. Accordingly, the old paradigms are quite logically replaced by new ones, which is the essence of the history of science.

It is also worth noting that with a paradigmatic approach, positivism will act as one of the paradigms of scientific knowledge. Traditionally, it is the dominant paradigm in natural sciences (Shovy, & Azmy, 2024: 44). However, with the general scientific use of the positivist paradigm, fragmentation is already occurring, into social (Biely, 2024), evolutionary and critical positivism. And in general, positivism itself is in the cycle of scientific knowledge, because it originates from empiricism (Shovy, & Azmy, 2024: 45).

By the cyclical development of scientific knowledge, we mean the cycle of development of individual paradigms that evolve to the stage of a revolution in the method (Senkevich, et al., 2021: 168-169), after which qualitatively new knowledge appears, and a paradigm shift occurs and the cycle begins again. The cyclical nature of scientific development is dictated by the fact that, according to Kuhn, knowledge cannot be in a static state, since it is characterized by permanent development.

Another regularity of paradigmatic development is its permanent nature, because a paradigm cannot be replaced unless another one comes in its place. A paradigm shift, on the one hand, is a determinant of the development of scientific knowledge; on the other hand, it characterizes the crisis of an already existing system of

knowledge. That is why this change can be accompanied by the chaotic development of scientific research in a certain field over a certain period.

The start of development of paradigmatic approaches in legal psychology is determined by the universalization of the term by Thomas Samuel Kuhn in 1962. Since then, the paradigmatic approach is used in legal-psychological framework (Saraiva, 2024). In this case, the first question that arises is the following. A paradigm is part of the core and concluding (though not final, given the cyclical nature of the evolution of scientific knowledge according to Kuhn) structural element of a scientific revolution. This element is known as a «paradigm shift». The evolution of scientific knowledge must reach a specific stage before distinct paradigms can begin to form within it. The cycle commences with the transition of scientific knowledge from a state of «pre-science» to that of «normal science» (Kuhn, 1962: 23-26).

Kant speaks of mathematics as a science where a revolution of thinking has already taken place, which is also reflected in the work of Thomas Kuhn, because, speaking of the «mature» sciences where scientific paradigms were first formed, Kuhn also points to mathematics and astronomy. Biological knowledge forms relatively modern paradigms, while the existence of scientific paradigms in the social sciences remains in question. Like Immanuel Kant, Thomas Kuhn writes about the achievements of Francis Bacon, as well as paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions in the natural sciences (Chafe, 2023: 1-10; Veves-Jimenez & Mora-Rojas, 2023, Kant, 1919). Overall, Kantian ideas frequently appear in Kuhn's scholarly work. Central to characterizing

Kuhn's theory of scientific revolution is the so-called «Copernican Revolution», which most accurately exemplifies a revolution in thought, a paradigm shift in scientific knowledge, and a qualitative change in scientific research.

An integral part of the paradigmatic approach to studying the evolution of scientific knowledge is its legal psychological and socio-psychological aspect, because in order for the process of «scientific revolution» and subsequent paradigm shift to occur, it is necessary for the scientific community to accept that set of theories, concepts, ideas, epistemes, and frames (Seuthe & Freyberg, 2024; Mansouri, 2024). This is the first requirement for the formation of a paradigm in science.

Despite the methodological and scientific pluralism inherent in the paradigmatic approach within the history of science, specific scientific paradigms themselves are characterized by a certain dogmatism regarding a particular scientific direction, rather than by a synthetic approach to scientific knowledge (Gaj, 2023; Ok, 2024; Kim, 2025). Thomas Kuhn in his work – «The Function of Dogma in Scientific Inquiry» (1961), points out that practitioners of any science can draw knowledge from different researchers who may contradict each other, citing Descartes, Newton, and Copernicus as examples, and that a scientist can take ideas from all three, even if they contradict each other, but representatives of a certain paradigm can have only one scientific primary source «but that same group, if it has a paradigm at all, can have only one» (Kuhn, 1961: 352).

So, there is another interpretation of Kuhn's works, which determines that only those fields where there is a single paradigm can be

considered science – that is, where there is a social scientific consensus around the fundamental, basic ideas, knowledge that form one dominant paradigm (Potters, 2024). According to this criterion, all social sciences, humanities, including legal psychology cannot be considered science, since there is paradigmatic pluralism (Fuller, 1994: 9), which indicates the absence of verified knowledge that becomes axiomatic (Joshua, 2014: 83-86).

Therefore, these sciences should be defined as pre-paradigmatic. Because of this, Kuhn is criticized by representatives of the humanities (Preston, 2024), because in their opinion, Kuhn's doctrine of the «scientific revolution» is not relevant for the socio-humanities (Joshua, 2014: 84).

We can consider the concept of a scientific paradigm as a dominant direction in the development of scientific knowledge at a particular time, or as a direction in scientific knowledge that exists in contrast to other directions. Thomas Kuhn leaves open the question of what in modern science and philosophy can be considered a specific example of a scientific paradigm. The characteristic structural elements of the concept of «paradigm» in a scientific context are gnoseological, epistemological and social components.

The epistemological element of the concept of «paradigm» characterizes the very essence of this phenomenon as a procedural tool for systematizing the process of transition from learned knowledge to qualitatively new ones (Tunç, 2023)

The gnoseological element characterizes the essence of the paradigmatic approach itself: abstraction from general rules, which is followed by three processes: identification of scientific knowledge, interpretation and rationalization.

Social component of the paradigm is its need to be accepted by the society, mainly by the scientific community, in order to become one.

DISCUSSION

All the above raises the question: can a paradigm be considered an epistemological category ((Navarro & Pino, 2024; Kallestrup & Kavasins, 2025), or should it be classified within the realm of modern gnoseology? Referring to the categories defined by Immanuel Kant in «*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*», the epistemological context of the paradigmatic approach will be its noumenal manifestation, and the epistemological context will be its phenomenal manifestation. It is the socio-psychological factor that differentiates these relations (Kant, 1919).

At a subconscious level, representatives of a certain paradigm recognize the exhaustiveness of the problematic issues that form this paradigm. For example, after the paradigm shift in the natural sciences, which is associated with Newton's scientific achievements, those issues that are revealed in the «*Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*» are not subject to rethinking and are treated as resolved. The same can be said about other sciences and paradigms: representatives of the psychoanalytic paradigm in applied psychology (Peiro, 2025) do not question the scientific achievements of Sigmund Freud, but can only interpret it differently, although the very issue of the absence of a dominant paradigm in psychology calls into question its scientific value (according to Kuhn) (Melnik, 2013; Ribeiro-Schneider, 2023; Turunen, 2023).

Due to this problem, the question of paradigm determination is raised in Section V of

Thomas Kuhn's fundamental work, in which the author differentiates the concepts of «rules» and «paradigms», defining a pattern that characterizes another essence of the concept of «scientific paradigm» - their inherent social abstraction from other paradigms. Thus, rules, axioms, dogmas that operate in one paradigm may not be considered as such and may not operate in others. «Abstraction from general rules» is followed by three processes: identification of scientific knowledge, interpretation and rationalization (Kuhn, 1962: 44-45).

Nevertheless, some contemporary authors tend to view Thomas Kuhn's epistemological doctrine as contingent (Daniel Omodeo, 2016: 86), while regarding the phenomenon of paradigm shift and the concept of the «paradigm» itself as falling within the realm of historical determinism. After all, as the author himself further notes, the Copernican Revolution relied on the foundations of Neoplatonism – meaning it would have been impossible without the objective development of the historical process – and possesses a derivative, cumulative character (Daniel Omodeo, 2016: 88). By this logic, the same cumulative approach can be used to review the development of legal psychology.

It is far easier to observe paradigm shifts in the natural sciences. For instance, a scientific revolution followed the publication of Isaac Newton's «Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica». Thomas Kuhn frequently cites this example to characterize the scientific-evolutionary cycle, as Newton's work yielded unprecedented knowledge that rendered the prevailing paradigm – and the knowledge upon which it was based – irrelevant. At the same time, the issue of such «qualitatively» new, unprecedented knowledge

remains an open question for the humanities and the social and behavioral sciences.

CONCLUSIONS

The paradigmatic approach itself focuses on the study of the evolution of scientific knowledge, but research is conducted in the context of a specific «frame» meaning specific categories of thinking inherent in the scientific community. The definition of the concept of «paradigm» requires specifying the use of the term «frame» in this context.

The concept of «frame» in the paradigmatic approach to the study of the history of different fields of science, including legal psychology, is revealed in the article by Professor Stefan Partelow of the University of Bonn. He defines the concept of «frame» in science as an auxiliary structure, around a more complex structure, or a system of rules, ideals and ideas that are used to plan or decide something (Partelow, 2023: 511).

Taking the evolutionary approach to the history of science as a basis, we can determine the following pattern: since at the initial stage of the development of scientific knowledge, a scientific paradigm cannot appear, the main condition for the emergence of any scientific paradigm is the acquisition of qualitatively new scientific knowledge (Chaparak, 2023). The source of the conditional «end» of the existence of a scientific paradigm is also scientific knowledge, which has a qualitatively new essence in relation to the paradigm-forming previous knowledge. Based on this, we can define a paradigm as a procedural tool for systematizing the process of transition from learned knowledge to qualitatively new knowledge. In addition, it performs as a function of directing scientific knowledge to a specific

problem that remains relevant. Ultimately, the paradigm itself determines which issues and problems are relevant and which are not.

The main function of the scientific paradigms, according to Thomas Kuhn, is to determine the pattern of development for «mature» sciences. The paradigm does not exist in the field of art, its manifestations may claim certain analogies in the social sciences (Kaushik, & Walsh, 2019), but in this case, by mature sciences Thomas Kuhn means the natural sciences, to which he gravitates in his fundamental works.

According to Thomas Kuhn, the essence of a «scientific revolution» is the replacement of one dominant scientific theory by another that is «incompatible» with the previous one. This incompatibility is dictated by the essence of the concept of «revolution» - a fundamental change in the prevailing system, including the scientific and methodological one.

The process of a scientific revolution is characterized by a state of change and stability. Stability is manifested in the process of «normal science», when researchers act in the context of the dominant paradigm at that time. A paradigm shift occurs when the development of scientific knowledge reaches an unprecedented level.

Thus, a paradigm is a set of scientific achievements that structure already known scientific knowledge and act as its characteristic elements.

Thomas Kuhn once again confirms the deterministic nature of the emergence of scientific paradigms, comparing purely theoretical sciences (such as mathematics), natural and social sciences, such as legal psychology and applied psychology (Lotysh, & Balatska, 2024: 22-27), consider-

ing that in some social sciences the question of whether any dominant paradigm has emerged remains debatable.

References:

- Becerra, D., & Cárdenas, F. (2025). The path towards a new paradigm: sustainability as the transformative axis in contemporary law. *Novum Jus*, 19(1), 267-291. <https://doi.org/10.14718/novumjus.2025.19.1.10>
- Bedau, M. A. (2024). Kuhnian Lessons for the study of Open-Ended Evolution. *Artificial Life*, 30(3), 337-344. https://doi.org/10.1162/artl_a_00428
- Belgrano, M. (2021). «World» and «Paradigm» in Heidegger and Kuhn. *Franciscanum*, 63(175), 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.21500/01201468.4716>
- Bentley, J. (2024). Positivist or post-positivist philosophy of science? The left Vienna Circle and Thomas Kuhn. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, 107, 107-117. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.08.003>
- Biely, K. (2024). Paradigm changes in research: Kuhn meets socio-ecological transition theory. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 480, 144057. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.144057>
- Boechat, W. (2023). Devouring and asphyxia: paradigm crisis, the depletion of the hero and complex thought1. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 68(2), 241-254. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5922.12911>
- Chafe R. (2023). Rejecting choices: The problematic origins of researcher-defined paradigms within qualitative research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 22, 1-10. URL: https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVer=2&DestApp=WOS_CPL&SrcCustomerID=5e3815e904498985e796fc91436abd9a&SrcAuth=atyponcel&SrcApp=literatum&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=000968195000001
- Chaparak, A. (2023). Toward a new stage for the epistemology of futures studies: Exploring social epistemology. *Futures*, 153, 103237. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103237>
- Cominelli, L. (2025). The socio-cognitive perspective: Why does «the cognitive» matter? *Oñati Socio-legal Series*. <https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl.2303>
- Daniel Omodeo, P. (2016). Kuhn's Paradigm of Paradigms: Historical and Epistemological Coordinates of The Copernican Revolution. In: *Shifting Paradigms: Thomas S. Kuhn and the History of Science*. Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften. URL: <https://www.mprlseries.mpg.de/>

- Demidenko, N. M., & Bilous, T. L. (2023). Concept, subject and method of legal psychology. *Bulletin of Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs*, 101(2 (Part 2)), 317-323. <https://doi.org/10.32631/v.2023.2.62>
- De Saussure, F. (1916). *Cours de linguistique generale*. Lausanne: Payot. Edition critique 1997. xviii+513 p.
- Fernández-Domínguez, J., Lara Clares, C., Bagasheva, A. (2020). *Paradigmatic Relations in Word Formation*. (Empirical Approaches to Linguistic Theory, Vol. 16). Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2020. 265 p.
- Fuller, C. (1994). Legal Anthropology.: Legal Pluralism and Legal Thought. *Anthropology Today*, 10(3), 9. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2783478>
- Gaj, N. (2023). Epidemiological Models and Epistemic Perspectives: How Scientific Pluralism may be Misconstrued. *Foundations of Science*, 30(2), 507-527. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09936-7>
- Geier, M. (2011). Eine Revolution der Denkart. In *VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften eBooks*. 31-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-93069-5_2
- Gori, P. (2024). Thomas Kuhn's Late Incommensurability Thesis as a Wittgensteinian Pragmatism. *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, XVI(1). <https://doi.org/10.4000/11p4zv>
- Guba E., Lincoln Y. (1982). Epistemological and methodological bases of naturalistic inquiry. *Educational Communication & Technology*, 30, 233-252. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02765185>
- Hauge, K. H. (2024). How ethical areas of post-normal science can invigorate mathematics education. *Futures*, 160, 103394. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2024.103394>
- Hilton, G. M., Bhuller, Y., Doe, J. E., Wolf, D. C., & Currie, R. A. (2023b). A new paradigm for regulatory sciences. *Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology*, 145, 105524. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yrtph.2023.105524>
- Joshua, G.M. (2014). An overview of Thomas Kuhn's views on paradigm shift, and its application to sociology. *International Journal of Technical Research and Applications*. Volume-2, Special Issue 7 (Nov-Dec 2014), 83-86. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340446569_AN_OVERVIEW_OF_THOMAS_KUHN'S_VIEWS_ON_PARADIGM_SHIFT_AND_ITS_APPLICATION_TO_SOCIOLOGY
- Kallestrup, J., & Cavin, E. (2025). Epistemic deferral, gnoseology, and intellectual ethics. *Asian Journal of Philosophy*, 4(1), 62. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-025-00287-7>
- Kankam, P. K. (2019). The use of paradigms in information research. *Library & Information Science Research*, 41(2), 85-92. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lisr.2019.04.003>
- Kant I. (1919). *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Leipzig: Der Philosophischen Bibliothek, Band 37, 1919. 866 S.
- Kaushik, V., & Walsh, C. A. (2019). Pragmatism as a research paradigm and its implications for social work research. *Social Sciences*, 8(9), 255. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8090255>
- Kim, M. S. (2025). Legal pluralism that wasn't: State and the plurality of law in late medieval and early modern Europe. *Tijdschrift Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue D Histoire Du Droit / the Legal History Review*, 93(1-2), 130-167. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718190-20250108>
- Krauss, A. (2024). Debunking revolutionary paradigm shifts: evidence of cumulative scientific progress across science. *Proceedings of the Royal Society a Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences*, 480(2302). <https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2024.0141>
- Kuhn, T. S. (1961). The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research. A. C. Crombie (ed.). *Scientific Change (Symposium on the History of Science)*, University of Oxford. pp. 347-369.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Vol. 2, No. 2). University of Chicago Press. xvii+210 p.
- Lehmann-Hasemeyer, S., Prettnner, K., & Tscheuschner, P. (2023). The scientific revolution and its implications for long-run economic development. *World Development*, 168, 106262. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106262>
- Lorenzetti, C. S., Raicik, A. C., & Peduzzi, L. O. Q. (2024). Periodic law, chemical elements and scientific discoveries: considerations from Norwood Hanson and Thomas Kuhn. *Foundations of Chemistry*, 26(3), 447-465. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-024-09512-2>
- Luckhardt C. G. (1978). Beyond knowledge: Paradigms in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. *Philosophy and phenomenological research*, 12(39), 240-252. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2106982>
- Lotysh, T., & Balatska, O. (2024). Reasonableness of court decisions in the paradigm of psychological, logical and doctrinal analysis. *ScienceRise: Juridical Science*, (2 (28), 22-27. <https://doi.org/10.15587/2523-4153.2024.307745>
- Mansouri, A. (2024). Scientific Realism vs. Evolutionary Epistemology: A Critical Rationalist Approach. *Acta Analytica*, 40(2), 363-378. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-024-00606-2>
- Mayoral, J. V. (2023). The Normal and the Revolutionary: Kuhn's Conversations with Rorty. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 36(2), 105-120. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2248546>
- Mendoza, A. L. R. (2023). Legal psychology from social psychology. historical introduction of forensic psychology. *Forensic Research & Criminology International Journal*, 11(1), 5-7. <https://doi.org/10.15406/frcij.2023.11.00361>
- Melnik V. (2013). Psykholohichna antropohiia ta klinichna psykholohiia. // *Medychna nauka ta praktyka XX stolittia*.

- [Psychological anthropology and clinical psychology] K.: Kyiv-skyi medychnyi naukovyi tsentr, 13-15. [In Ukrainian]
- Melnyk V. (2025). From Res Publica to Stato: Ancient Roman and Medieval Terminologies of the Concept of the State and Their Early Modern Transformations. *Politology Bulletin*, 95. 106-127. <https://doi.org/10.17721/2415-881x.2025.95.106-127>
- Melnyk V. (2025b). Paradyma istorizmu v sotsialnii psykholohii: sutnist spivprychetnosti ta pryvilei identychnosti. *Habitus: Sotsialna psykholohiia. Yurydychna psykholohiia*, Vypusk 71. S. 299-306. <https://doi.org/10.32782/2663-5> [In Ukrainian]
- Merlo, E. M. (2023). Considerations on the Fundamental Relationship between Clinical Psychology and Epistemology. *Directory of Open Access Journals*. <https://doi.org/10.13129/2282-1619/mjcp-3965>
- Navarro, J., & Pino, D. (2024). The boundaries of gnoseology. *Philosophical Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02205-8>
- Neder, G. (2024). Paradigma legalista, cultura jurídica e religião em perspectiva transdisciplinar. *Rei - revista estudos institucionais*, 10(4), 1069-1089. <https://doi.org/10.21783/rei.v10i4.871>
- Ok, B. (2024). From Feyerabend's scientific pluralism to Kymlicka's political multiculturalism: the question of Social unity. *Beytulhikme an International Journal of Philosophy*, 14(14:3), 755-774. <https://doi.org/10.29228/beytulhikme.76030>
- Ozerskyi, I. (2024). Identification of legal psychology as an independent branch of law. *SSP Modern Law and Practice*, 4(4), 1-7. <https://doi.org/10.53933/ssmplp.v4i4.163>
- Partelow, S. (2023). What is a framework? Understanding their purpose, value, development and use. *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences*, 13(3), pp. 510-519. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-023-00833-w>
- Peiró, J. M. (2025). Applied Psychology and Careers in the 21st Century. Challenges and opportunities. *Australian Journal of Career Development*, 34(2), 114-123. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10384162251350691>
- Politi, V., & Shan, Y. (2023). Beyond Structure: New Frontiers of the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 36(2), 81-86. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2264158>
- Potters, J. (2022). Conceptualizing paradigms: on reading Kuhn's history of the quantum. *Annals of Science*, 79(3), 386-405. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2022.2063945>
- Preston, J. (2024). Kuhn's paradigms and their early critics. *Journal of Physics Conference Series*, 2877(1), 012072. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2877/1/012072>
- Ribeiro-Schneider, D., Bolaños-Pizarro, M., Bueno-Cañigral, F. J., Aleixandre-Benavent, R., & Valderrama-Zurián, J. C. (2023). Figuras adicionales del artículo publicado en la Revista Acta Psiquiátrica y Psicológica de América Latina 69 (3) y 69
- (4). *Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)*. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8362454>
- Salgar, E. (2023). Thomas S. Kuhn and the transformation of the concept of Scientific progress. *Beytulhikme an International Journal of Philosophy*, 13(13:3), 130-157. <https://doi.org/10.29228/beytulhikme.69294>
- Saraiva, I. (2024). Ciencia de la información y paradigmas: una revisión desde la filosofía kuhniana. *Estudios De Filosofía*, 72. <https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.356885>
- Schindler, S. (2024). Normal science: not uncritical or dogmatic. *Synthese*, 203(4). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04527-w>
- Sek-Ciudalcampo, & Atencia-Conde-Pumpido, P. (2024). Extendiendo la Genealogía de la Semántica de Thomas Kuhn. Una Mirada a las Conferencias Lowell y la Estructura de las Revoluciones Científicas. *Estudios De Filosofía*, 72. <https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.358023>
- Senkevich, G. A., Khilko, A. S., & Aksonov, O. I. (2021b). Scientific paradigm theory as model and methodology of scientific knowledge. *Scientific Notes of V I Vernadsky Taurida National University Series Philology Journalism*, 3(1), 168-174. <https://doi.org/10.32838/2710-4656/2021.1-3/29> [In Ukrainian]
- Seuthe, A., & Freyberg, S. (2024). Pluralism and the unity of science: physics and political epistemology in Cassirer's phenomenology of knowledge. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 57(3), 471-495. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-024-09658-y>
- Silvia, M. (2021). Unveiling Human Behaviour: A comprehensive exploration of influential paradigms in psychology. *Social Science Chronicle*, 1(1), 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.56106/ssc.2021.005>
- Shovy, A., & Azmy, L. U. (2024). Ferdinand de Saussure's Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Concepts of Charles Sander Peirce in the Quran on Qauliyah and Kauniyah Verses: Semiotics Approach. *Journal of Arabic Language Studies and Teaching*, 4(1), 37-59. URL: <https://doi.org/10.15642/jalsat.2024.4.1.37-59>
- Starynskyi, M., & Zavalna, Z. (2025). Paradigms in law: the reality of modern legal science. Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, 1, 58-64. <https://doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2025.01.8>
- Sternberg, R. J. (2023). Unwrapping Gifts: Understanding the inner workings of giftedness through a panoply of paradigms in the field of psychology. *Roeper Review*, 45(2), 84-100. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02783193.2023.2172754>
- Tanghe, K. B. (2023). Thomas S. Kuhn: key to a better understanding of the extended evolutionary synthesis. *Theory in Biosciences*, 143 (1), 27-44. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12064-023-00409-w>
- Tunç, D. U. (2023). The subject of knowledge in collaborative science. *Synthese*, 201(3). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04080-y>
- Turunen, P., Hirvonen, I., & Pättiniemi, I. (2023). Epistemological scientism and the scientific meta-method. *European Journal for Philosophy of Science*, 13(2). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00526-9>

- Vivas-Reyes, R. (2024). Clashing perspectives: Kantian epistemology and quantum chemistry theory. *Foundations of Chemistry*, 26(2), 291-300. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-024-09508-y>
- Vélez-Jiménez, D., & Mora-Rojas, C. O. (2023). Fundamentos histórico-filosóficos de la química. *Sophia*, 34, 291-313. <https://doi.org/10.17163/soph.n34.2023.10>
- Walasik, A. (2024). Ekonomia finansowa jako nauka normalna: ujęcie krytyczne z perspektywy koncepcji paradygmatów Kuhna oraz naukowych programów badawczych Lakatosa. *Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny I Socjologiczny*, 86(1), 133-147. <https://doi.org/10.14746/rpeis.2024.86.1.08>
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1953. 229 p.
- Ylönen, M., & Aven, T. (2023). A framework for understanding risk based on the concepts of ontology and epistemology. *Journal of Risk Research*, 26(6), 581-593. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2023.2194892>
- Zagaria, A. (2024). Is Evolutionary Psychology a scientific Revolution? A bibliometric analysis. *Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology*, 10(1), 31-49. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40750-024-00234-5>

Петрушенко Вікторія

Доктор медичних наук, професор, Вінницький національний медичний університет імені М.І. Пирогова, м. Вінниця (Україна)

«ПАРАДИГМА» ЯК ТЕОРЕТИЧНА КАТЕГОРІЯ ЮРИДИЧНОЇ ПСИХОЛОГІЇ

АНОТАЦІЯ

Вступ. Поняття «парадигма» посідає центральне місце у філософії науки та методології наукового пізнання, однак його застосування в юридичній психології залишається недостатньо концептуалізованим. Зростання міждисциплінарних досліджень потребує уточнення теоретичних засад використання цієї категорії з урахуванням історико-філософських, епістемологічних і психологічних підходів.

Мета. Визначити теоретичні основи поняття «парадигма» в контексті юридичної психології та обґрунтувати його як цілісну епістемологічну категорію.

Методи. Використано структурно-функціональний метод для аналізу основних компонентів поняття «парадигма», а також історіософський, епістемологічний і гносеологічний підходи для досліджен-

ня закономірностей розвитку наукового знання та формування парадигм у юридичній психології.

Результати. Встановлено, що поняття «парадигма» нерозривно пов'язане з процесами розвитку наукового знання, соціально-історичними умовами функціонування науки та концепцією наукових революцій Томаса Куна. Показано, що формування наукової парадигми можливе лише за наявності нових знань, які отримують визнання наукової спільноти. Обґрунтовано, що структура парадигми включає епістемологічний, гносеологічний і соціальний компоненти, які визначають механізми розвитку юридико-психологічної науки.

Висновки. Парадигма в юридичній психології є інструментом систематизації та інтерпретації наукового знання, що забезпечує перехід від усталених теоретичних моделей до нових концептуальних підходів. Її розвиток має циклічний характер і залежить від взаємодії когнітивних, методологічних та соціальних чинників. Запропоноване трактування розширює теоретичні засади юридичної психології та може бути використане для подальших досліджень її методологічних основ.

Ключові слова: парадигма, юридична психологія, епістемологія, гносеологія, наукова революція, зміна парадигми.

Viktoriia Petrushenko

Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor,
National Pirogov Memorial Medical University, Vinnytsia (Ukraine)

THE “PARADIGM” AS A THEORETICAL CATEGORY IN LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY

ABSTRACT

Background. The concept of a *paradigm* occupies a central position in the philosophy of science and the methodology of scientific inquiry. However, its application in legal psychology remains insufficiently conceptualized. The growing interdisciplinary nature of contemporary research necessitates a clarification of the theoretical foundations for using this category, taking into account historical-philosophical, epistemological, and psychological perspectives.

Objective. To determine the theoretical foundations of the concept of *paradigm* within the context of legal psychology and to substantiate it as an integrated epistemo-

logical category.

Methods. A structural-functional method was employed to analyze the principal components of the concept of *paradigm*. In addition, historiosophical, epistemological, and gnoseological approaches were applied to examine the patterns of scientific knowledge development and the formation of paradigms in legal psychology.

Results. The study demonstrates that the concept of *paradigm* is intrinsically connected with the development of scientific knowledge, the socio-historical conditions of scientific activity, and Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. It is shown that the emergence of a scientific paradigm is possible only when new knowledge gains recognition and acceptance within the scientific community. Furthermore, the structure of a paradigm is substantiated as comprising epistemological, gnoseological, and social components that determine the mechanisms underlying the development of legal psychological science.

Conclusions. In legal psychology, a paradigm serves as a tool for the systematization and interpretation of scientific knowledge, facilitating the transition from established theoretical models to new conceptual approaches. Its development is cyclical and depends on the interaction of cognitive, methodological, and social factors. The proposed interpretation expands the theoretical foundations of legal psychology and may serve as a basis for further research into its methodological framework.

Keywords: paradigm; legal psychology; epistemology; gnoseology; scientific revolution; paradigm shift.

How to cite (як цитувати):

Petrushenko, V. (2025). THE "PARADIGM" AS A THEORETICAL CATEGORY IN LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY. *PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNAL*, 11(12), 18–30. <https://doi.org/10.31108/1.2025.11.12.2> [in Ukrainian]

Петрушенко, В. (2025). «ПАРАДИГМА» ЯК ТЕОРЕТИЧНА КАТЕГОРІЯ ЮРИДИЧНОЇ ПСИХОЛОГІЇ. *ПСИХОЛОГІЧНИЙ ЧАСОПИС*, 11(12), 18–30. <https://doi.org/10.31108/1.2025.11.12.2>

Дата отримання статті: 21.10.2024

Дата рекомендації до друку: 21.11.2025

Дата оприлюднення: 30.12.2025